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The two books under review represent insightful contributions to two current trends in political
thought: the attempt to recognize the role of emotional life in politics, and the attempt to encourage
(North American) political theorists to engage with non-Western theory. By coincidence, in talking about
radically different aspects of affect, they also demonstrate the wide variety of interests and concerns that
bring scholars to these issues.
Denise Riley’s book is a phenomenology of affect in our day-to-day use of language. Her goal is to try
to attune us to how language affects us, so that we can become more self-aware and effective actors, in
political life and elsewhere. She does this by trying to stake out a middle ground between two
conceptions of language. On one hand is the view that speakers wield language precisely, like a tool—that
we do things with words. On the other hand is the view that language is a relatively stable and impersonal
force that pushes us around—that words do things to us. Riley argues that neither of these theories fully
explains our experience. Speakers frequently discover that their words have a life of their own, while
listeners discover that the effects of language are rarely as certain as those of the proverbial sticks and
stones. As Riley describes it, rather than being a tool or a fate, language is “that outward unconscious
which hovers between people” (p. 4).
Riley’s solution to the uncontrollable and unpredictable emotional impact of language is to both
recognize and cultivate a Stoic indifference. For example, sometimes the best way to overcome words
that wound is by seeing the malediction as an impersonal thing. The speaker cast the curse in a moment
and forgot it immediately. At the same time, the word itself has no deep connection with me—it does not
name any truth about my self. She writes, “I have to let it go indifferently, as a thing to which I myself
have become as indifferent as the bad word itself had really been, all along, to me” (p. 23).
This theme runs through nearly all of her lyrical dissections of our experience of language, which
include the oddness of agreeing that one used to be beautiful; the relationship between loneliness and the
public/private distinction; the compromise between action and despair expressed by asking, “Why me?”;
the role that being afraid to disrupt linguistic/cultural convention might play in causing accidental
pregnancy; the horrible feeling that your true but conventional excuse is heard as a lie; the frustration of
having only prudish or childishly vulgar language for sex talk; the impossibility of responding to the
charge “If you pro-choice folks had your way, I wouldn’t be here”; and finally the unsettling mix of self
and nonself that is one’s given name.
Riley’s close observations of language do generally support her argument that language both eludes our
attempts to control it and fails to affect us in a fully deterministic fashion. When it comes to language, we
are never entirely either subject or object. However, I am less convinced that her attempts to relate this to
agency and politics are successful. I have two kinds of concerns, both of them traditional worries about
the politics of ataraxia. The first is about the effect of cultivated indifference on us as agents. Riley’s
proposal that I overcome a genuine hurt by realizing that an insult’s effect is not directly related to the
speaker’s intentions, or to any feature of my self, but rather is an impersonal artifact of language, seems
to heal only through an evacuation of meaning and identity. The word’s power evaporates because there
is nothing for it to attach to anymore. My second concern is the converse of the first: at the same time that
I depersonalize my own experience, I depersonalize the actions and intentions of those who have affected
me. Much of the power of speech gets displaced here onto language as an independent phenomenon, and
there is no obvious target or goal of political action. Perhaps indifference can ease our pain, but I don’t
see how it can make us more effective actors.
Whereas Riley’s use of “affect” refers to our direct experience of emotions, the contributors to Hahm
Chaihark and Daniel A. Bell’s edited volume use “affective relations” to refer to the various personal,
private-sphere relationships that characterize Confucian political systems and at least potentially interfere
with the impersonal, public-sphere ties that are essential to the rule of law and the impartial
administration of liberal democracy. (The five primary relationships of Confucian political thought are

husband-wife, father-son, older brother–younger brother, ruler-subject, and friend-friend.) The goal of the
book is to explore what role these affective relations play in Confucian-influenced political systems, and
to ask how different those systems are from the broadly liberal systems of North America and Western
Europe. While Riley encourages us to appreciate the often-hidden role of emotion in our language and
politics, the contributors to The Politics of Affective Relations encourage us to consider how the varying
roles of affect may differentiate political cultures.
The thirteen generally excellent essays group around three themes: rule of law, civil society, and the
family. Shaomin Li’s essay lays out a rigorous and persuasive argument that the reliance on personal
relationships that is typical of East Asian business culture is rooted less in Confucianism than in the
economics of developing economies. When markets are small and local, it is efficient for businesses to
rely on personal relationships with potential customers or partners. But as markets expand in size and
scope, Li argues, it becomes cheaper to base business decisions on publicly available information, such as
that provided by credit-reporting agencies, annual reports, and stock performance. However, this shift
depends on that publicly available information being accurate, and thus subject to reliable regulation and
oversight through a robust legal system. Thus, Li suggests that the preference in East Asian economies,
and East Asian cultures more generally, for relying on affective relations may wane as markets grow and
expand.
Many of the essays address questions about civil society, ranging from the appropriateness of the
concept when applied to Asian societies, to the history of civil society within Confucian political thought,
to the recent experience of civil society in China. Fred Dallmayr’s provocative essay suggests that
Confucian-influenced political cultures may not be able to fully develop civil society without accepting a
sixth basic social relationship: “that between citizen and citizen in a shared public sphere and under a
common rule of law” (p. 54). Such a change might help to counterbalance the hierarchy embedded in the
traditional five relationships, while according to the citizen-citizen relationship the same sense of
constitutive necessity the others enjoy.
The politics of gender and family are addressed in essays by David B. Wong and Sin Yee Chan. Chan’s
nuanced essay addresses the relationship between Western liberal feminism and Confucianism, building
on the insight that both appear to see politics and the family as parts of a single continuum. To summarize
the point too simply, Confucians believe that the principles at work in the family (filial obedience, respect
for age and rank) also apply to the political sphere, while liberal feminists believe that the principles at
work in political life (equal rights, the pursuit of justice) also apply in the family. Despite this apparent
similarity, Chan argues, feminists and Confucians have deeply different politics because they have deeply
different understandings of what the family is. For Confucians, the family and politics operate on the
same principles and are for that reason deeply connected, even continuous. One hopes for the same kinds
of success within the family and outside of it, and one seeks that success by following the same
principles. In contrast, Chan argues, liberal feminists see the family as a special place, sheltered from the
dangers and demands of the public sphere, where each individual can be nurtured and given an
atmosphere of equality and cooperation. In other words, while both see affinities between family and
politics, Confucians genuinely see the two as forming a continuum, while liberal feminists seek to import
some of the values of the political sphere into what would nonetheless remain a distinct private one.
My suspicion is that both of these challenging and insightful books will appeal primarily to specialists.
In both cases, that would be a pity. Riley’s book, despite my reservations about its political usefulness,
artfully reveals the hidden affect in many mundane language games. The Hahm and Bell volume is an
excellent introduction to the range of debate about Confucian-influenced political systems, and would be
a good place for theorists interested in secondary literature on Confucianism to start.

